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ARTICLE 14 OF CHINA’S NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW:
USING OPEN-TERM CONTRACTS TO APPROPRIATELY
BALANCE WORKER PROTECTION AND EMPLOYER
FLEXIBILITY
Jovita T. Wang†
Abstract: China’s economy rapidly developed as it shifted from a planned
economy to a market economy. Cheap labor encouraged foreign companies to conduct
business in China, but that business came at the expense of labor protection. Workers
who had previously enjoyed lifetime employment suddenly faced rampant layoffs, labor
abuse, and unemployment. Despite China’s implementation of the Labor Law in 1994,
labor abuse continued, especially by employers refusing to follow written contract
requests to define the employment relationship. Many workers were left unprotected.
In response to these problems, China passed the Labor Contract Law in 2007 to
clarify requirements of employment contracts and to inform both employers and workers
of their rights and obligations. The law was intended to promote better employment
relationships. Article 14 of the Labor Contract Law worked to accomplish this end by
allowing the use of open-term employment contracts. Foreign companies and investors,
however, have voiced concern that the Labor Contract Law’s encouragement of openterm contracts will negatively affect their business in China and make it nearly
impossible to dismiss workers. Some of these fears have been realized in South Korea
under similar employment laws.
While open-term contracts will inevitably increase some business costs, the benefits
of the new Chinese Labor Contract Law outweigh such costs. Because workers will be
more invested in business operations, open-term employment contracts will improve
employment relationships and make businesses more profitable. Additionally, in contrast
to South Korea’s employment laws, Article 14 of the Labor Contract Law includes
sufficient regulations and flexible requirements to prevent open-term employment
contracts from becoming a ticket to lifetime employment. Open-term employment
contracts can advance China’s economic development.

I.

INTRODUCTION

China is experiencing rapid growth while developing into a market
economy. Behind the country’s economic success, however, lies widespread
labor abuse.1 Workers’ main recourse in employment disputes is self-help.2
Recruiters often falsely lure migrant workers into abysmal working
conditions, where wages are withheld and security guards prevent escape.3
†
Juris Doctor expected 2010, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professor Mary Hotchkiss and the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their
guidance throughout the writing process.
1
Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the
People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1050, 1050 (2007).
2
Id.
3
ANITA CHAN, CHINA’S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF LABOR IN A
GLOBALIZING ECONOMY 7-8 (Mark Selden ed., 2001).
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These types of abuses have resulted in domestic and some international
pressure on China to reform its labor laws.4 The Chinese government has
recognized that it must reconcile economic growth with increased
“governability, stability, and democracy.”5
In 1994, the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s
Congress (“NPC”) of the People’s Republic of China adopted the Labor Law
of the People’s Republic of China (“Labor Law”). China’s passage of the
Labor Law was a stride towards creating a harmonious work structure in
China’s changing economy.6 The Labor Law provided comprehensive rules
addressing workers’ rights, labor contracts, discrimination, and social
insurance.7 Workers, however, still found worker protections inadequate.8
The protections of the Labor Law only applied to workers who had a written
contract or strong proof of an employment relationship.9 Because many
employers did not provide such contracts despite being required to do so by
the Labor Law, many workers were left unprotected.10 Often, employers
overworked and underpaid their workforce.11 Employers regularly refused
to renew contracts.12 Additionally, the government enforced labor laws
inconsistently, especially because provinces and local cities created their
own regulations.13
On January 1, 2008, China’s new Labor Contract Law (“LCL”) went
into effect.14 The government made improvements to the 1994 Labor Law
by changing contractual employment protections and expanding the scope of
application.15 The LCL is the first national law in China governing
4

See Cooney, supra note 1, at 1050.
SUJIAN GUO & BAOGANG GUO, Introduction to CHALLENGES FACING CHINESE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 11 (Sujian Guo & Baogang Guo eds., 2007).
6
Labor Law [Labor Law 1994] art. 1 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.).
7
Id.
8
See Aaron Halegua, Getting Paid: Processing the Labor Disputes of China’s Migrant Workers, 26
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 254, 274 (2008).
9
Id.
10
Haina Lu, New Developments in China’s Labor Dispute Resolution System: Better Protection for
Workers’ Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 247, 256 (2008).
11
Lyle Morris, An Uncertain Victory for China’s Workers, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, June 24, 2008,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=10983Yale Global (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
12
Draft Law on Labor Contracts Made Public—Views Sought, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 21,
2006, http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2006-03/21/content_1162551.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
13
Jeffrey A. Blount & Lixin Chen, Working With China’s New Labor Contract Law, in DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA 129, 131 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2008).
14
Labor Contract Law [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.).
15
It applies to “all aspects of labor contracts between workers and enterprises, all types of economic
entities, and private non-profit entities.” Adam Bobrow et al., International Legal Developments in
Review: 2007, 42 INT’L LAW. 945, 962 (2008). Xie Liangmin of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
5
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employment contracts.16
For instance, it addresses the formation
requirements of an employment contract, whereas the previous labor law did
not.17 Under the Labor Law, local tribunals had freedom to implement
regulations that reflected their own interpretation of the Labor Law. By
contrast, LCL provides guidance to ensure that local regulations will be
uniform and consistent with national law.18 Such uniformity should help
companies with operations in more than one city ensure compliance.19
The LCL aimed to increase worker protection in response to China’s
fast-paced and capitalist-style economic growth.20 The law passed after the
slave labor scandal in the coal mines of Shanxi and Henan provinces.21 The
government realized that violations of workers’ rights, not to mention the
resulting strikes, negatively affected social stability and economic
development.22 The government passed other employment laws in addition
to LCL, such as the Employment Promotion Law.23 This legislative
overhaul demonstrated China’s recognition that it must protect workers to

has stated that, "[t]he new law is not designed to replace the current Labor Law; rather, it attempts to
further standardize the labor contract in favor of employees.” Labor Law: 'No Giving in to Pressure,'
CHINA DAILY, Jun. 12, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/213567.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2009).
16
Employees’ Rights to be Better Protected, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 25, 2006, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/china/national/2006-12/28/content_1193715.htm.
17
Sean Cooney et al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity
of Labour Relations in the PRC, 30 UNIV. N.S.W. L. J. 786, 787, 792 (2007).
18
Joanna Law, Employment Regulations May Prove a Burden for Employers, CHINA L. & PRAC.,
Oct. 2008.
19
Id.
20
See Morris, supra note 11.
21
China's Legislature Adopts Labor Contract Law, XINHUA, Jun. 30, 2007, http://english.
people.com.cn/200706/29/eng20070629_388809.html# (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). Migrant workers were
forced to work long hours without compensation in illegal mining and brick kilns industries. Id. See
Joseph Kahn & David Barboza, China Passes a Sweeping Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 2007. There
was public outcry when the government failed to prosecute many of the responsible officials. Han
Dongfang, The Shanxi Brickyard Scandal and Child Labour in China, CHINA LAB. BULL., July 25, 2007,
http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/47600 (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
22
Zana Z. Bugaighis, Comment, What Impact Will the Revised Trade Union Law of China Have on
Foreign Business?, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007). See also Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A
Giant's Growing Pains, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.usnews.com/
usnews/opinion/articles/060123/23edit.htm (mentioning the higher concentration of economic growth along
the coast has resulted in peasant worker strikes in the interior parts of the country).
23
“The law is enacted to promote employment, promote positive interaction between economic
development and increase of employment, and promote the harmony and stability of society.”
Employment Promotion Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Jan. 1, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (P.R.C.).
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prevent future social unrest.24 In many respects, the LCL sought to bring
business practices in China more in line with international standards.25
Some foreign companies and investors are concerned that Article 14
of LCL encourages open-term employment contracts. An open-term
employment contract is a contract for which the employer and the employee
have agreed not to stipulate a definite ending date.26 Two possibilities raise
particular concern: first, that the provision will be enforced unfairly against
foreign employers; and second, that the provision will increase costs by
reducing the ability of businesses to expand and contract when economically
necessary. Generally, employers are concerned with LCL’s long-term
implications for the workforce.
This Comment asserts that while these are valid concerns, particularly
in light of the effect of similar labor laws in South Korea, LCL strikes the
appropriate and necessary—although imperfect—balance between
protecting workers’ rights and allowing employers to retain flexibility, which
in turn ensures the productivity and profitability of their businesses. The
LCL does not create employment for life, nor does it force employers to
retain workers when doing so would be detrimental to business. Combined
with clarifying regulations, LCL paves a bright path for China’s future social
and economic development.
Part II of this Comment provides background on the employment
changes enacted by the Chinese government and discusses the legislative
history behind the 1994 Labor Law and the law’s unresolved issues. Part III
discusses how the new LCL seeks to resolve the gaps left by the 1994 Labor
Law and focuses on Article 14—the provision providing for open-term
contracts as well as its implementing regulations. Part IV addresses the
possible impact of LCL, particularly Article 14, on foreign businesses, many
of which are concerned that the law is too burdensome.27 It also explains the
concerns of foreign businesses by analyzing the effects of a similar labor law
in South Korea. Part V discusses how LCL alleviates these concerns and
contrasts the Chinese Law with the Korean law. Part VI describes the
potential benefits of flexible open-term contracts to China’s transition from
an industrial to a value-added economy.

24
See A Worker’s Manifesto for China; Economics Focus, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2007; St.
Council, Notice of the State Council on Doing a Good Job in Promoting Employment (Feb. 3, 2008),
available at LAWINFOCHINA (P.R.C.).
25
See Morris, supra note 11.
26
Labor Contract Law art. 14.
27
See Morris, supra note 11.
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THE 1994 LABOR LAW INADEQUATELY ADDRESSED THE NEEDS OF
CHINA’S WORKERS

China, as a rapidly developing country, has encountered problems
with employers abusing the labor force.28 Politicians initially enacted the
Labor Law of 1994, which provided a foundation of new worker and
employer rights in response to the labor abuses created by the combination
of China’s economic change to factories and the loss of guaranteed
employment.29 The law was made to protect the interests of labor in a way
that reflected the societal needs of the developing market economy.30 The
Labor Law additionally aspired to establish a uniform body of rules that
would equitably govern all employers and workers in China.31 Yet the Labor
Law of 1994 also left many questions unanswered and was weakly
enforced.32
A.

The Labor Law of 1994 Was Intended to Protect China’s Workers in
Response to Its Changing Economy

The Labor Law of 1994 was passed to protect Chinese workers. In
the 1950s, the Chinese Communist Party stringently protected employment
through its “‘iron rice bowl’ system,” which guaranteed lifetime
employment.33 Once China transitioned from a planned economy to a
socialist market economy, however, layoffs, unemployment, and labor abuse
became rampant.34 In response to these problems, China enacted the Labor
Law, which passed on July 5, 1994, and came into effect on January 1,
1995.35 The Labor Law applied to all enterprises and individual economic
organizations and protected laborers whose employment was governed by an
employment contract.36
Its stated purpose was to implement the
Constitutional provisions that protect “the legitimate rights and interests of
laborers, readjust labor relationships, establish and safeguard a labor system
suited to the socialist market economy, and promote economic development
28

See Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 410.
K. Lesli Ligorner, 2008: Year of Broadening Employee Rights and EEO Protections in China,
CHINA L. & PRAC., Jun. 2008.
30
Labor Law 1994 ch. 1.
31
See Douglas C. Markel, Editor’s Notes: PRC Labour Law, CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 1994.
32
See id.
33
J. PRYBYLA, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: PROBLEMS & POLICIES 132, 173 (2d ed. 1981). See also
Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 409 (mentioning how jobs were provided by local labor bureaus and included
furnished housing and health coverage).
34
Bugaighis, supra note 22, at 410.
35
Labor Law 1994.
36
Id. art 2.
29
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and social progress.”37 The law was intended to provide worker protections
through the usage of employment contracts.
B.

The Labor Law of 1994 Failed to Strengthen Worker Protection

Despite the Labor Law’s laudable goals, it did not provide detailed
specifications for employment contracts and, thus, failed to increase the
ability of contracts to protect workers. For instance, the law did not specify
what constitutes an invalid employment contract and did not provide strong
regulation of open-term contracts.38 Only Article 20 of the Labor Law
discussed the terms of employment contracts and did not specify what
constitutes “fixed term, flexible term or taking the completion of a specific
amount of work as a term.”39 For example, Article 20 provided that if a
laborer works for the “same employing unit for ten years or more and the
parties involved agree to extend the term of the labour contract, a labour
contract with a flexible term shall be concluded between them if the labourer
so requested.”40 The law seemed to put the burden on the worker to make
the request. Article 20 provided no further information regarding the
different requirements for each contract. As a result, the law did not
generate clear expectations for employers and workers.41
In addition, employers failed to follow crucial requirements of the
Labor Law, resulting in continued job insecurity. In particular, employers
often failed to comply with the Labor Law’s mandatory requirement to
create a written contract before establishing a working relationship.42 By not
providing written contracts, employers avoided supervision by labor bureaus
and avoided paying taxes and mandated insurance.43 Employers also
retaliated against workers who requested a written contract in accordance
with the Labor Law.44 Countrywide, as of 2006, it was estimated that
seventy percent of rural workers and fifteen percent of urban workers have
no contract.45 Even workers with contracts often had contracts with terms of

37

Id. art. 1.
LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 2005 489 (Liu Fahe ed., 2005).
39
Labor Law 1994.
40
Id.
41
LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA 2005, supra note 38, at 489.
42
See Halegua, supra note 8, at 273-74.
43
Id. at 276.
44
See id.
45
Brendan Smith et al., Multinationals to China: No New Labor Rights (Business Against Labor
Rights in China), MULTINATIONAL MONITOR (Nov.-Dec. 2006), http://find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?
action=interpret&contentSet=IACDocuments&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=EAIM&docId=A1628
83794&source=gale&version=1.0&userGroupName=wash_eai&finalAuth=true (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
38
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three years or less.46 For instance, it was estimated that sixty percent of all
contracts were for three years or less.47 Hence, job security had not
improved.
With discontent among workers growing a decade after the Labor
Law’s passage, the Chinese government began focusing on improving
workers’ rights.48 The government decided to achieve this goal by
elaborating on and strengthening the requirements of employment contracts
through legislation.
III.

THE NEW LABOR CONTRACT LAW OF 2007 ADDRESSES WORKER
PROTECTION AND SOCIAL STABILITY IN CHINA’S ERA OF RAPID
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The LCL builds upon the goals of the Labor Law of 1994 by, first,
furthering protection of workers’ rights and, second, providing a predictable
and uniform framework for local tribunals in making employment law
decisions.49 The first draft of LCL was issued for public comment on March
20, 2006.50 After making substantial modifications over the course of four
drafts, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted the final version on June
29, 2007, which became effective January 1, 2008.51 The LCL applies to all
employers doing business in China, regardless of the number of persons
employed.52 The LCL also seeks to promote “harmonious” relationships
between employers and workers and to protect “the lawful rights and
interests” of workers.53
A.

The LCL Clarifies the Conditions of Employment Relationships

In contrast to the Labor Law, LCL clearly stipulates the requirements
of an employment relationship through the use of contracts. It provides
specific requirements for employment contracts. For instance, LCL requires
that all employment contracts be in writing.54 It further provides that
employers must maintain a written worker handbook stating the basic rules
46

Id.
Id.
48
See Draft Law on Labor Contracts Made Public—Views Sought, supra note 12.
49
See Putting China’s Labour Contract Law into Practice, CHINA L. & PRAC., Mar. 2008 (translated
by Joanna Law).
50
Cooney, supra note 1, at 1077.
51
Haina Lu, supra note 10, at 248.
52
Labor Contract Law art. 2.
53
Labor Contract Law art. 1.
54
Labor Contract Law art. 10.
47
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and regulations of employment.55 The LCL also states that probationary
periods be limited according to the employment contract, with the maximum
possible period of six months—a reiteration of the Labor Law of 1994.56
The LCL, however, elaborates on time periods when the probation period is
reduced.57 Additionally, it defines the requirements for mandatory noncompetition agreements, making such agreements only applicable to senior
management or workers with access to important trade secrets and limiting
their duration to two years.58
The LCL also provides additional requirements to ensure that
employers comply with its requirements for employment contracts. In the
hopes of improving employer-worker relations, employers are required to
consult with workers or the labor union when deciding on important rules
and matters related to the workers, such as working hours, rest days, labor
safety, and labor discipline.59 Employers may also only terminate workers
for cause consistent with the regulations stated in the workers’ handbook or
in accordance with the law.60
The LCL clearly stipulates penalties for violations of the law and
provides avenues for workers to protect themselves.61 This information
serves as a deterrent against employers by making the costs of violations
clear, predictable, and real. If employers fail to follow the new LCL, they
will be subject to administrative fines, awards of double wages, and liability
55

See Labor Contract Law.
Labor Contract Law art. 19; Labor Law 1994 art. 21.
57
Labor Contract Law art. 19.
58
Labor Contract Law arts. 23-24.
59
Labor Contract Law art. 4. “Where an employer formulates, amends or decides rules or important
events concerning the remuneration, working time, break, vacation, work safety and sanitation, insurance
and welfare, training of employees, labor discipline, or management of production quota, which are directly
related to the interests of the employees, such rules or important events shall be discussed at the meeting of
employees’ representatives or the general meeting of all employees, and the employer shall also put
forward proposals and opinions to the employees and negotiate with the labor union or the employees’
representatives on a equal basis to reach agreements on these rules or events.” Id.
60
Labor Contract Law art. 39. “Where an employee is under any of the following circumstances, his
employer may dissolve the labor contract: 1. It is proved that the employee does not meet the recruitment
conditions during the probation period; 2. The employee seriously violates the rules and procedures set up
by the employer; 3. The employee causes any severe damage to the employer because he seriously neglects
his duties or seeks private benefits; 4. The employee simultaneously enters an employment relationship
with other employers and thus seriously affects his completion of the tasks of the employer, or the
employee refuses to make the ratification after his employer points out the problem; 5. The labor contract is
invalidated due to the circumstance as mentioned in Item (1), paragraph 1, Article 26 of this Law; or 6. The
employee is under investigation for criminal liabilities according to law.” Id.
61
Labor Contract Law ch. VII. “If the rules and procedure of an employer directly related to the
employees’ interests is contrary to any laws or regulations, the labor administration department shall order
the employer to make ratification and give it a warning. If the rules and procedures cause any damage to
the employees, the employer shall bear the liability for compensation.” Id.
56
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for actual damages.62 The law allows workers to sue their employers by
giving workers a private right of action, which can be brought in the local
employment arbitration bureau or local courts.63 The LCL therefore expands
both employers’ obligations and workers’ rights in comparison to the 1994
Labor Law.
B.

The LCL Protects Workers Through Encouragement of Open-Term
Contracts, but also Gives Employers Flexibility

Article 14 of LCL protects workers by encouraging, and sometimes
even requiring, the increased use of open-term contracts. Open-term
contracts continue for an indefinite term until the employer or worker
terminates it. Termination of open-term contracts, however, is statutorily
governed.64 As a result, Article 14 is one of the most hotly contested
provisions in LCL because it decreases the ability of employers to terminate
at will.65
1.

The LCL’s Article 14 Encourages and Expands Open-Term Contracts

Article 14 of LCL limits the ability of employers to use fixed-term
employment contracts, generally requiring that contracts be open-term
whenever an employee remains with the same employer for an extended
period. Under the 1994 Labor Law, employers could discharge workers
either at the expiration of a term contract or for cause.66 In the past,
employers used short-term contracts to avoid terminating for cause, because
an employer could terminate the worker after the stated contractual period
without needing to pay severance or provide a reason.67 The new LCL limits
this practice.68 In response, employers are concerned about business
flexibility, adaptability, and responsiveness.69 Under Article 14, an employer

62

Labor Contract Law ch. VII. “If an employer violates this Law by dissolving or terminating the
labor contract, it shall pay compensation to the employee at the rate of twice the economic compensations
as prescribed in Article 47 of this Law.” Labor Contract Law art. 87.
63
Labor Contract Law art. 77. “For any employer whose lawful rights and interests are impaired, he
may require the relevant department to deal with the case, apply for an arbitration, or lodge a lawsuit.” Id.
64
Labor Contract Law. See also Jian Hang, Doing Business in China: Understanding China’s
Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law, in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 107, 109 (Practising Law Institute eds.,
2008) (mentioning how there is no employment at-will common law counterpart in China).
65
See Morris, supra note 11.
66
Jian Hang, Doing Business in China: Understanding China’s Newly Adopted Labor Contract Law,
in DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 110 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2008).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Putting China’s Labour Contract Law into Practice, supra note 49.
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is permitted to enter, at most, only two fixed-term contracts with a worker.70
Severance pay is required for terminating fixed-term contracts, thus adding
costs to fixed-term contracts.71 The restrictions on fixed-term contracts
encourage more employers to use open-term contracts with workers, which
provide more protections.72
In comparison to the Labor Law, LCL’s Article 14 defines more
clearly those situations when open-term contracts are created. The Labor
Law mentioned open-term contract requirements only in passing, under
Article 20. Article 20 of the Labor Law required mandatory open-term
contracts when a worker had worked for the same employer for ten or more
years and that worker formally requested an open-term contract from the
employer.73 Now, LCL provides detailed information to help employers
navigate open-term contracts. The relevant provision of LCL’s Article 14
states: “The labor contract with unfixed terms shall be concluded unless
laborers request the conclusion of a labor contract with fixed
terms . . . [w]here a labor contract with fixed terms has been concluded for
two consecutive times.”74 After the expiration of a second-term contract, the
subsequent employment contract is considered an “open-term contract,”
under which the worker will be employed until he or she decides to
terminate the contract, reaches retirement age, or until certain circumstances
occur that give rise to termination.75 Under Article 14, an open-term
contract also results when the worker has been working for the employing
unit for ten consecutive years, and in circumstances when contracts have
been re-concluded due to a restructuring but the worker has been working
for the employing unit ten consecutive years and is less than ten years from
the statutory retirement age.76 These examples illustrate LCL’s expanded
use of open-term contracts.
2.

The LCL Considers Employers’ Interests by Providing Safeguards to
Prevent “Employment for Life”

Aware that mandating open-term contracts could harm business, the
National People’s Congress, the country’s legislative body, attempted to
balance both the goals of employers and workers in the drafting of LCL.
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Labor Contract Law art. 14.
Labor Contract Law art. 46.
Jian Hang, supra note 66, at 110.
Labor Law 1994 art. 20.
Labor Contract Law art. 14.
See generally Labor Contract Law art. 14.
Labor Contract Law art. 14.
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The first draft of LCL stated that a labor relationship without a written
contract would be “regarded as a long term labor relationship unless the
worker expresses otherwise.”77 Article 14 seems to enact a compromise
between the two parties, by providing that, after one year, a labor
relationship without a written contract would be considered an employment
contract of indefinite term.78 Hence, an employer does have some flexibility
in creating employment contracts and not all default contracts will be openterm.
In response to business concerns that Article 14 reverts back to the
“iron rice bowl system” of imposing lifelong employment, China’s State
Council, the country’s Cabinet equivalent, issued an implementing
regulation for LCL.79 The Implementing Regulation of LCL provides more
guidance in interpreting LCL, including Article 14.80 The Council’s goal in
drafting the regulations was to assure employers that an open-term
employment contract would not be an “iron rice bowl”, and that employers
could still dismiss workers if they had proper grounds.81
The Council’s regulations for LCL provide flexible circumstances for
worker termination.82 The regulations took immediate effect on September
18, 2008.83 With respect to Article 14 of LCL, the regulations explicitly
provide the exceptions under which an employer can terminate a worker
with an open-term contract.84 The regulations clarify the applicability of
fourteen circumstances listed in Article 19 of the regulations, stating that an
employer may terminate an open-ended contract under any of the listed
circumstances.85 Thus, the regulations make clear that LCL’s list of fourteen
permitted termination circumstances applies to open-term contracts.86
Most importantly, the regulations provide employers and workers the
ability to negotiate termination of an open-term contract. The first allowed
77

Haina Lu, supra note 10, at 257.
Labor Contract Law art. 14.
New Regulation Clears Labor Contract Law Misunderstanding, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 19,
2008, http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2008-09/19/content_16503117.htm (last visited Nov. 15,
2008).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Contract Law 'Boost for Social Security,' CHINA DAILY, Sept. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/news/2008-09/20/content_16508773.htm.
84
Labor Contract Law ‘Unfairly Criticized,’ CHINA DAILY, Mar. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.china.org.cn/government/NPC_CPPCC_sessions2008/2008-03/12/content_12338793.htm.
85
Regulation on the Implementation of the Employment Contract Law [Regulations] art. 19
(promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 3, 2008, effective Sept. 18, 2008) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited
Nov. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.).
86
See Regulations art. 19; Labor Contract Law arts. 39-41.
78
79
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circumstance for termination is based on a negotiated consensus between the
employer and the worker.87 It allows for termination if both parties agree to
termination. It is possible that under this exception, employers might force
workers to agree to terminate the open-term contract. At the very least,
however, the regulations here give employers and workers the ability to
bargain about the termination of an open-term contract. Unlike the “iron
rice bowl” system, both parties are not required to stay together if they wish
otherwise.
The regulations also empower employers to terminate open-term
contracts due to worker actions during the employment period. The second
enumerated circumstance allows termination when “the employee is proved
to have failed to meet the employment conditions during the probation.”88
The third and fourth circumstances allow for termination when the
“employee seriously violates the rules and procedures set up by the
employer” or “the employee seriously neglects his duties or engages in
malpractice for personal gains and has caused severe damages to the
employer.”89 The fifth listed circumstance permits termination when “the
employee simultaneously enters an employment relationship with any other
employer and thus seriously affects his completion of the tasks assigned by
the employer, or the employee refuses to correct after the employer has
pointed out the problem.”90 Pursuant to the above circumstances, employers
can terminate unsatisfactory workers.
Circumstances six and seven permit termination based on criminal or
otherwise illegal actions of the worker—even when the actions in question
did not occur during work. The sixth circumstance allows termination if the
employment contract was procured illegally.91 Integrating item one in LCL’s
Article 26, the regulation states that an employment contract is invalid if
“the employee, by means of deception or coercion or by taking advantage of
the employer’s difficulties, forces the employer to conclude or change the
employment contract against the employer’s true will.”92 Under LCL, if a
dispute over the validity of a contract arises, either the labor dispute
arbitration authority or the people’s court makes the determination.93 The
seventh circumstance allows for termination when “the employee is under

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Regulations art. 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Labor Contract Law art. 26(3).
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investigation for criminal liabilities.”94 Employers are not required to retain
a worker when the worker’s actions have shown a potential harm to the
business.
The Council regulations also empower employers to terminate
employees based on circumstances that may be beyond the worker’s control.
Circumstances eight and nine consider situations when it is no longer
feasible for the worker to continue the employment relationship.95 For
instance, the relationship can be terminated when “the employee is sick or is
injured for a non-work related reason and cannot resume his original
position after the expiration of the prescribed time period for medical
treatment, nor can he assume any other position arranged by the
employer.”96 A worker can also be terminated when he or she “is
incompetent for his position and is still so after training or being assigned to
another position.”97 These circumstances provide that while an employer is
initially required to accommodate the worker, if such accommodations do
not work, the employer may have grounds for termination. Although
employers would need to provide some severance payment, they are not
obligated to retain incapable workers.98
External changed circumstances can also provide the basis for
termination. Circumstance ten states that if there is a major change in the
objective circumstances relied upon at the time the employment contract was
executed, the contract might be voidable.99 Circumstance ten only applies if
the contract terms cannot be performed and both the worker and employer
are unable to reach an agreement on amending the existing employment
contract.100 An employer can also terminate the contract if it experiences
“serious difficulties in production and business operations.”101 If the
employer changes its production activity in an enterprise—e.g. introducing a
material technology innovation or adjusting its operation—it may be allowed
to fire workers.102 Such termination, however, depends on whether the
employer has amended employment contracts and, nevertheless, finds
reduction in its workforce necessary.103 Additionally, the regulation includes
a catchall, stating that termination may be granted when there are “other
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Regulations art. 19.
Id.
Regulations art. 19(8).
Regulations art. 19(9).
See Labor Contract Law.
Regulations art. 19.
Id.
Regulations art. 19(12).
Regulations art. 19(13).
Id.
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objective economic situations in which the employment contract is based
change substantially, which makes it impossible to perform the employment
contract.”104 The regulation also allows termination when the “employer is
being restructured according to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.”105
The regulations implementing LCL address multiple situations in
which an employer can terminate a worker with an open-term contract. The
regulations enumerate possible economic situations where an employment
relationship may be terminated because it no longer benefits the business.
The regulations do not force employers to retain workers should the business
change its employment needs, nor do they require employers to retain
workers who commit crimes or who become unable to perform required job
duties.
3.

The LCL Regulations Guide the Implementation Timeline for OpenTerm Contracts, Protecting Workers and Providing Notice to
Employers

In an effort to clarify potential misunderstandings between employers
and workers, the regulations provide additional guidance as to when a
contract becomes open-ended. As noted above, Article 14 of LCL provides
that an open-term contract is created once a worker remains with an
employing unit for ten consecutive years. The regulations spell out how this
ten-year requirement is calculated. The Labor Law had no such guidance.
Article 9 of LCL regulations stipulates that the time period begins on the
date the employer started using the worker, even if that date occurred prior
to the new LCL.106 As mentioned earlier, the conditions requiring open-term
contracts under Article 14 exist when a second fixed-term contract expires,
or when the worker has been working for the same employer for ten
consecutive years.107 While LCL’s Article 14 strongly supports open-term
contracts, a fixed-term contract seems to be the default rule for renewals
unless the stipulations under Article 14 apply. Hence, employers are not
stuck with open-term contracts when they first hire a worker so long as they
create a contract within a year.108

104

Regulations art. 19(14).
Regulations art. 19(11). See also Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jun. 1, 2007) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Dec. 21,
2008) (P.R.C.).
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Regulations art. 9.
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Labor Contract Law art. 14.
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See Labor Contract Law art. 14.
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The LCL regulations further state that while an open-term
employment contract has no definite ending date, the contract is not
preserved if valid reasons exist for its termination.109 In practice, then, openterm contracts have significant similarities to regular contracts. Open-term
contracts provide sufficient flexibility for employers to adjust their
workforce. Additionally, the regulations provide a framework for local and
provincial tribunals to implement their own regulations consistent with LCL.
They do not amount to a reversion to China’s “iron rice bowl” system.
However, despite these efforts to clarify Article 14, some foreign
companies are wary of the law’s implications.
IV.

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED COSTS
THAT MAY RESULT FROM OPEN-TERM CONTRACTS, INCLUDING
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF LCL

Foreign corporations in China have expressed concern that LCL will
be enforced disproportionately against them, increasing business costs and
making investment in China less desirable.110 They are particularly
concerned about Article 14’s imposition of open-term contracts.111 While it
is true that most of these concerns arose before passage of LCL’s
regulations, some of these concerns remain valid—especially in light of
experiences in Korea, which has labor laws similar to China’s.
A.

Foreign Employers Are Concerned that LCL Unfairly Targets Them

Based on past experience, foreign employers fear that enforcement
actions will disproportionately target them. Reports indicate that foreign
companies generally comply with Chinese laws and that most worker abuse
occurs at Chinese-owned firms.112 In fact, one of the critiques of the Labor
Law of 1994 was that its lax and unfair enforcement put complying
companies at a competitive disadvantage.113 Foreign companies newly
operating in China cite unclear regulations as one of the biggest challenges
109
Sino-Link Consulting, Implementation Regulation for Law of the People's Republic of China on
Employment Contracts Effective, http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5453 (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
110
Aaron Halegua, The Debate Over Raising Chinese Labor Standards Goes International, 1 HARV.
L. POL’Y. REV. (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.hlpronline.com/2007/04/halegua_01.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2009) [hereinafter Halegua, The Debate].
111
Id.
112
US-China Business Council Staff, The New Labor Contract Law, 34 CHINA BUS. REV. 42, 43
(2007).
113
David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Boost Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
2006, at A1.
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to conducting business.114 Some critics believe that the main issue is not that
Chinese laws lack worker protection but, rather, that enforcement of such
laws is poor.115 Such inconsistency in enforcement and implementation
generally discourages businesses from investing and expanding
operations.116
B.

Foreign Employers Are Concerned that LCL Will Make it More
Difficult to Terminate Workers, Resulting in Additional Costs

Foreign employers are also concerned that LCL’s new requirements,
especially those governing termination, will significantly increase costs and
decrease China’s competitive value. The law does make termination more
difficult, potentially raising costs. Some companies, seeking less regulation,
have moved operations from China to other countries.117
1.

As a Result of the LCL, Some Foreign Employers Have Either Left or
Have Contemplated Leaving China

The LCL has adversely affected small and medium size companies,
especially in labor-intensive industries that adapt to change slowly.118 Since
the law’s enactment, some companies have left the country or found new
places to outsource their operations. For instance, some foreign companies
have left China to set up operations in countries with fewer worker
protections—such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Cambodia—to cut costs;
this trend is found most in those businesses with many labor-intensive
tasks.119 The LCL especially impacts smaller, labor-intensive Taiwanese and
Hong-Kong owned manufacturers because they have relied on China’s cheap
labor supply.120 Surveys from the American Chamber of Commerce and the
consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton indicate that foreign investors plan to
move some of their operations out of China as a result of the law’s
passage.121
114

AmCham-China, Part One The Business Climate for American Firms in China, 2008 WHITE
PAPER 12, 14.
115
Halegua, The Debate, supra note 110.
116
AmCham-China, supra note 114, at 26.
117
Halegua, The Debate, supra note 110.
118
Putting China’s Labour Contract Law into Practice, supra note 49.
119
See Morris, supra note 11. For instance, Nike has been shifting some production facilities to
Vietnam. Id.
120
Jonathan Adams & Ko Shu-ling, China: Judgment Day, 171.2 FAR E. ECON. REV. 32 (2008).
121
Megan Shank, Dealing With It: MNCs Learn to Cope with the Labor Law, MEGAN SHANK DOT
COM, Jun. 1, 2008, http://www.meganshank.com/articles/dealing-with-it/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). Booz
Allen Hamilton, a management consulting firm, and the American Chamber of Commerce Shanghai, a
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Open-term contracts stand as a major reason for corporate flight, as
evidenced by the fact that foreign companies both took steps to avoid openterm contracts before LCL’s passage and opposed the open-term provisions
of LCL. Foreign companies took special umbrage at LCL’s required
severance payments in certain worker terminations.122 For instance, prior to
the enactment, a few companies asked their workers to resign and then sign
a new two-year contract to avoid Article’s 14 impositions of indefinite
contracts, for example the French company, Carrefour.123 Even a domestic
corporation, Huawei Technologies Co., attempted to terminate employment
contracts with more than 7,000 workers before the law’s effective date in an
effort to dodge signing open-ended employment contracts.124 After talks
with the All China Federation of Trade Unions, Huawei later suspended its
plan.125 These examples demonstrate that at least some employers are
hesitant about the impact of open-term contracts. Employers detest paying
severance packages and fear costly litigation over whether a worker was
rightfully terminated.126
Yet, other variables besides the implementation of LCL explain the
hardships facing labor-intensive businesses. The rising value of the Yuan, an
increase in Chinese business taxes, and more protective environmental
regulations have also encouraged companies to locate operations
elsewhere.127 In addition, prior to the global economic downturn of 2008,
higher material costs were exerting pressure on the profits of many
industries.128 Because of these confounding factors, the impact of LCL’s
passage is hard to isolate. Even so, it seems likely that LCL explains some
corporate flight from China.

leading international business association in China, surveyed 66 of the largest foreign-owned and invested
manufacturers in China from September-November 2007. See Booz Allen/AMCHAM Shanghai Study
Finds Companies Adopting China as Both a Growth Market and Manufacturing Hub Are Two-Thirds More
Profitable Than Others, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.boozallen.com/news/
china_manufacturing_2008 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
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Labor Contract Law.
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See Morris, supra note 11.
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Chen Hong, Maneuver on Labor Law Faces Block, CHINA DAILY, July 22, 2008, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/6455167.html.
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New Regulation Clears Labor Contract Law Misunderstanding, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 19,
2008, available at http://www.china.org.cn/business/news/2008-09/19/content_16503117.htm.
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Employers Are Concerned About Similarities Between South Korea’s
Strict Labor Laws and China’s LCL

China’s LCL has similarities to South Korea’s main governing
employment law, the Labor Standards Act (“LSA”).129 For instance, the
LSA limits term contracts and requires a difficult standard of “just cause” for
termination of open-term employment contracts.130 The LSA has been
unequally enforced against foreigners and has proven inflexible for foreign
employers.131 South Korea has a reputation of having stringent and
inflexible employment laws.132 It even has higher employment protection
compared with other countries under the Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development.133 Similarities between LSA and LCL seem to
validate concerns that LCL will result in problems like those faced in South
Korea—especially given the similar history of labor relations in the two
countries.134
1.

South Korea’s Employment Law Limits Employers’ Ability to
Terminate Workers

In South Korea, employers do not have much flexibility to terminate
workers with open-term contracts and need “just cause.”135 South Korea’s
LSA sets a high standard for grounds of a termination to qualify as “just
cause.”136 Due to this high standard of protection, employers generally use
temporary and fixed-term contract workers. This leads to increased inequity,
as more temporary and fixed-term workers are employed without the same
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benefits and job security as employees with open-term contracts.137
Similarly, China’s LCL provides strong protections for workers with openterm contracts, which could result in Chinese employers opting to hire
workers for the short-term rather than for the long-term.
The use of fixed-term contracts in South Korea has created inequitable
results, which has led to disruptive protests, demonstrations, and strikes by
workers.138 These events have also reduced business profitability.139
Employers have justified hiring temporary and fixed-term contract workers
with the lower cost of such workers, which is estimated to be forty-four
percent lower than regular workers.140 However, the productivity of
temporary and fixed-term contract workers is estimated to be twenty-two
percent below regular workers with indefinite contracts.141 These hiring
practices have contributed to worker disgruntlement. A 2005 government
survey showed that while eighty percent of regular workers were satisfied,
only twenty-nine percent of non-regular workers were satisfied.142 Surveys
also showed limited mobility between regular and non-regular employment.
In 2003, only fifteen percent of non-regular workers transitioned to regular
employment.143 High turnover rates result, with sixty-two percent of nonregular workers having less than one year of tenure; in comparison, only
thirty percent of regular workers last less than one year.144 Employers also
provided less training to non-regular workers, probably because employers
are not required to provide such services to non-regular workers.145 Nonregular workers also lack protection from unions.146
All of these factors contributed to a volatile South Korean workforce
dissatisfied with LSA’s effects. The stringent regulations ultimately harmed
both employees and employers.147 Big corporations like Hyundai lost a few
days of productivity from worker strikes.148 In response, South Korea
137
RANDALL S. JONES, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING IN
KOREA IN THE CONTEXT OF RAPID POPULATION AGEING 41 (2008).
138
Kitt, supra note 134, at 547, 556.
139
Id.
140
JONES, supra note 137, at 41.
141
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142
Id. at 43.
143
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144
Id.
145
Id. See also Kitt, supra note 134, at 560-61 (mentioning how employers are not obligated to
provide benefits such as job training for temporary employees, thereby avoiding the protective provisions
under LSA).
146
Kitt, supra note 134, at 560-61.
147
Id. at 557.
148
Id. at 556. See also C. Jay Ou, Democracy on Trial: South Korean Workers Resist Labor Law
Reform, Multinational Monitor, 18.3 MULTINAT’L MONITOR 14, 14-15 (1997) (where close to 400,000
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passed the Act on Protection of Temporary and Part-time Workers in July
2007.149 Under that act, a temporary worker with a limited-term contract,
who works for more than two years, is automatically regarded as having an
open-term contract after the term contract ends.150 The experience of South
Korea fuels concerns that employers in China will also try to bypass the
increased protections of LCL—a condition that would only exacerbate
China’s worker inequality problem.
2.

Critics Contend that South Korea’s Employment Laws Are Unfairly
Enforced Against Foreign Corporations Due to Inadequate
Implementation Guidelines—A Concern also Raised by China’s LCL

Legal analysts have criticized South Korea’s employment laws for not
providing clear guidelines. Often, this ambiguity has caused employers to
hesitate in termination decisions for fear of litigation.151 For instance, the
LSA does not explicitly define “just cause” for the termination of open-term
contracts. Some possible examples from case law include “lack of aptitude,
continuing defective work, debilitating disease, breach of employment
contract, egregiously unacceptable behavior on the job, misrepresentation of
previous school or work experience, or an improper relationship with
another worker,” but the law itself does not provide any specifics.152 In
1997, at the request of the International Monetary Fund, a managerial
urgency requirement was inserted into LSA, allowing termination of a
worker for administrative reasons.153
Yet the managerial urgency
requirement clause remains ambiguous. It states that the requirement is
permitted when there is an “urgent administrative necessity for the transfer,
merger, or acquisition of the business in order to prevent administrative
deterioration.”154 The clause fails to clarify whether transfers, acquisitions,
and mergers are illustrative or exhaustive of the types of business conditions
that permit dismissal.155
Because of its unclear guidelines and lack of flexibility, critics claim
that LSA unfairly impacts foreign corporations doing business in South
Korea. Foreign investors have cited South Korea’s “inflexible labor laws”
unionists in the heavy industry sectors held nationwide strikes that caused hundreds of factories to
temporarily suspend production).
149
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150
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and “volatile labor-management relations” as significant impediments to
investment.156 South Korea’s reputation for having a “violence-prone labor
force” is another major reason why foreigners are discouraged to directly
invest.157 Additionally, the Korean labor market is generally the most
consistent worry for foreign multinational corporations, because they believe
it disadvantages management.158 The situation in South Korea might
therefore fuel concerns that open-term contracts and strict termination
guidelines will also prove harmful to foreign business in China.
For instance, in certain areas China’s LCL regulations are vague and
could be abused.
The LCL regulations require that in open-term
employment contracts both laborer and employer shall observe the principle
of equality and reasonability to decide the content of the labor contract other
than the term.159 Like the Korean law, the regulations do not provide a
definition or guide to determine what qualifies as a principle of “equality
and reasonability.” In addition, it is unclear what exactly counts as “serious”
or “material” under the fourteen permitted circumstances listed under LCL’s
implementating regulations.160 The regulations do provide some examples
of what types of conduct is “serious” and “material” sufficient to justify
dismissal of open-term employees (such as providing information to an
employer’s competitor), based on Article 19 of LCL’s implementing
regulations but fail to give guidance to courts as to how they should reach a
determination in a particular instance. In some ways, the regulations merely
repeat provisions already stated in LCL without more elaboration. Hence,
labor tribunals may have to issue their own regulations of interpretation,
which could make implementation of LCL less uniform.161
Additionally, while the regulations allow termination based on
objective, changed circumstances, the regulations do not explicitly refer to
Article 41 of LCL, which describes some such circumstances. This failure
to refer creates significant disonants. Article 41 of LCL requires that when
an employer terminates workers based on a restructuring (in accordance with
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law), a serious difficulty in production and
operation, or a change that causes the nonperformance of an employment
156
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contract, the employer must terminate workers on a priority basis.162 The
last workers to be terminated would be those who have executed an
employment contract with a relatively long fixed-term or an open-term
employment contract, or those who are the sole breadwinner of their family
and must support elders or minors. Moreover, if the employer must
terminate twenty or more workers, or more than ten percent of the total
workers, the employer is required to report to the labor union or all workers
thirty days in advance.163 Because the regulations, when listing the
circumstances related to objective, changed circumstances, fail to refer to the
remaining requirements of Article 41 of LCL, it is unclear whether these
requirements apply.164
The regulations are also unclear on whether an employer has the right
not to renew a second fixed-term contract.165 If employers do not have the
right to refuse renewing a second fixed-term contract, then employers will
likely be more reluctant to offer a second fixed-term contract, because to do
so would essentially create an open-term contract for the worker. If such is
the case, employers are only provided one fixed-term contract where they
are not obligated to give out an open-term contract. In addition, while the
regulations provide guidance on how to calculate time for the ten-year
period, they do not address nuances such as when a company merges with
another.166
162
Labor Contract Law art. 41. “Under any of the following circumstances, if it is necessary to lay
off 20 or more employees, or if it is necessary to lay off less than 20 employees but the layoff accounts for
10% of the total number of the employees, the employer shall, 30 days in advance, make an explanation to
the labor union or to all its employees. After it has solicited the opinions from the labor union or of the
employees, it may lay off the number of employees upon reporting the employee reduction plan to the labor
administrative department: 1. It is under revitalization according to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law; 2. It
encounters serious difficulties in production and business operation; 3. The enterprise changes products,
makes important technological renovation, or adjusts the methods of its business operation, and it is still
necessary to lay off the number of employees after changing the labor contract; or 4. The objective
economic situation, on which the labor contract is based, has changed considerably and the employer is
unable to perform the labor contract. The following employees shall be given a priority to be kept when
the employer cuts down the number of employees: 1. Those who have concluded a fixed-term labor
contract with a long time period. 2. Those who have concluded a labor contract without fixed term; and 3.
Those whose family has no other employee and has the aged or minors to support.If the employer intends
to hire new employees within 6 months after it cuts down the number of employees according to the first
paragraph of this Article, it shall notify the employees cut down and shall, in the equal conditions, give a
priority to the employees cut down.” Id.
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AN ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S LCL SHOULD ALLEVIATE FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS’ CONCERNS ABOUT ENFORCEMENT AND COSTS

China’s LCL provides more guidance than does South Korea’s LSA,
which should be sufficient to prevent abuse. It is unclear whether, in the
future, LCL will be enforced discriminatorily against foreign corporations,
raising the costs of doing business for these firms; however, as written the
LCL does not unfairly target foreign employers. And, thus far, the law has
not been wrongfully used against foreign employers.
A.

China Provides Flexibility and Clear Standards for Employers,
Particularly When Compared to South Korea’s Labor Standards Act

Although China’s LCL shows similarities to South Korea’s
employment laws, LCL provides standards that are more flexible and clear.
This increased flexibility and clarity should make enforcement less
burdensome, uncertain, and unfair. For instance, China’s law addresses the
problem of unlimited fixed-term contracts by limiting employers to two
renewals.167 At the same time, China provides more flexibility by not
limiting the term of the fixed-term contracts; in contrast, South Korean law
limits fixed-term contracts to two years.168
China also specifically defines part-time or temporary workers in
LCL.169 Part-time workers are paid on an hourly basis, cannot work more
than four hours daily, and cannot work more than twenty-four hours per
week.170 Their hourly pay must not be lower than the minimum wage
prescribed by the local government where the employer’s company is
located.171 In exchange for these restrictions, employers need not establish
written employment contracts or severance pay after termination for parttime employees.172 The LCL gives employers the opportunity to make use
original employer shall be counted as part of his/her years of service with the new Employer.” Using
Article 10, a merger could possibly mean that the new employer must still consider a worker’s years of
service with the prior employer in the determination of having open term contracts. This could potentially
have an impact on a company’s determination on whether to merge. Article 10, however, does provide that
if the previous employer has already made severance payments to the worker, the new employer does not
count the worker’s years of service with the prior employer when calculating severance pay after lawfully
terminating or ending an employment contract. Workers therefore do not get to benefit twice from two
employers unless their working period qualifies for each employer.
167
Labor Contract Law art. 14.
168
Id. See also Act on the Protection of Fixed-term and Part-time Employees, No. 8074 (2006) (S.
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169
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170
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of part-time workers; but, given the limited hours, it does not deter
employers from using them in place of regular workers.
The implementing regulations of LCL also address protections for
temporary workers. Although the law itself does not mention temporary
workers, Articles 27 through 32 of the regulations provide protections for
such workers. The law requires employers to inform temporary workers of
the job requirements for their position, provide them with the necessary
training, pay them the same amount as other workers doing the same job,
and most importantly, abide by state labor standards relevant to their
positions.173 Temporary workers are also subject to severance pay.174
Hence, while employers may hire workers on a temporary basis, LCL
contains fewer loopholes, and better protects such workers, than does South
Korea’s LSA.
In contrast to South Korea’s LSA, China’s LCL provides clearer
guidance and examples for its equivalent managerial urgency requirement.
As discussed above,175 the managerial urgency provision of LSA permits
employers to dismiss open-term employees under certain exigent
administrative circumstances, but supplies only broad categories to indicate
what circumstances qualify.176
By contrast, LCL supplies fourteen
circumstances under which an employer may terminate a contract.177 While
there may be nuances to the interpretation of the fourteen circumstances, the
examples limit the adjudicating tribunal’s discretion and give employers a
better sense of what events qualify for termination. While LCL and its
regulations do limit the reasons for termination, such limits are reasonable in
that they balance the competing interests of employers and their workers.
The initial reactions to LCL’s impacts and enforcement have been
positive. Based on statistics from twenty-six provinces, municipalities, and
autonomous regions, Minister of Human Resources and Social Security Yin
Weimin stated that, as of June 2008, the percentage of workers by region
that had signed employment contracts is now between ninety to ninety-six
percent.178 While there is not yet much data on issues dealing with
termination, a few months after the law’s passage, a Hitachi worker was
173
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properly fired even though she had signed an open-term contract.179 She
was fired for disobeying orders and continually making errors in her work.180
Although this is just one case, it supports the contention that Article 14 and
its implementing regulations have enabled termination when justified. To
further ensure consistent enforcement across jurisdictions, China could
invest in training programs to better educate and equip local officials and
their related institutions.181
While LCL regulates fixed-term contracts, it also provides clear
guidelines for indefinite-term contracts so that employers have a solid
understanding of termination circumstances. The guidelines will help make
termination justifications uniform on a national level, reducing unequal
enforcement of LCL. Additionally, by putting limits on fixed-term contracts,
workers are better protected; employers can no longer use fixed-term
contracts to avoid the obligations that accompany full employment.
Standards for protecting temporary and part-time workers should also deter
employers from substituting part-time workers for regular workers, reducing
concerns of an unstable workforce like South Korea’s.
B.

The LCL Has Not Been Used to Unfairly Target Foreign Employers

The LCL has been enforced primarily against domestic, rather than
foreign, employers. Most multinational corporations already comply with
local labor laws and regulations in their Chinese facilities.182 Generally, the
companies that complied with the Labor Law have not been as affected by
enforcement of LCL.183 It is even likely that, over the long term, LCL will
actually help big, foreign corporations due to the law’s impact on smaller,
local competitors who did not comply with the Labor Law, and who will
now be forced to adapt.184 Big corporations might therefore have an
advantage. In fact, foreign investment in China has continued to grow since
LCL’s enactment.185 Some European governments also find laws like LCL
179
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helpful in conducting business in China and view them in a positive light.186
Generally, profitable Western companies are not leaving China as a result of
the law, despite prior threats.187
Consequently, it appears that LCL has not been unequally or unfairly
enforced against foreign companies and employers. Enforcement actions
brought against domestic companies, like the case of Huawei Technologies
discussed above,188 indicate that LCL will be applied equally to both
domestic and foreign employers. When Huawai, one of China’s largest
producers of telecommunications equipment, tried to influence workers to
quit and sign new employment contracts with the intention of avoiding openterm contracts, authorities in Guangdong province’s court and arbitration
committee designed a new set of regulations that would have made such a
maneuver illegal.189
VI.

CHINA’S LCL WILL HELP ACCOMMODATE CHINA’S GROWING
ECONOMY

In addition to improving the general workers’ condition, LCL and its
regulations will help pave the way to an increasing focus on value-added
industries, such as technology and services to better improve the economic
progress of China.190 Having a stable, dependable, and cooperative
workforce is crucial to develop these industries. Open-term contracts can
help China achieve that goal.191 Additionally, studies from other countries
show that open-term contracts do not generally create widespread
unemployment and may actually prove beneficial to the economy.192
A.

China Is Shifting Its Economy to Value-Added Industries That Will
Require Better Employment Relations

In response to some negative effects from manufacturing industries,
cities in China have been shifting their focus to value-added industries.193
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Manufacturing provides the least amount of profits globally.194 It has
resulted in serious social and environmental problems in some of China’s
biggest cities.195 For instance, Beijing encourages foreign investment in
industries that bring China more expertise, technology, and better jobs
instead of industries in the low-end sector.196 Other cities want to make
similar changes. For instance, Guangdong is moving away from its
emphasis on the export-processing industry.197 While the industry made
Guangdong one of China’s wealthiest cities, workers’ rights were constantly
violated while local officials turned a blind eye.198 Turnover was extremely
high, and corporations violated environmental and labor laws.199 Valueadded industries, on the other hand, not only make greater profits, but also
tend to require a better-trained workforce, which requires more investment
to retain and train workers.200 In this light, China’s focus on changing its
dominant industries can lead to better social relations, in addition to better
profits. However, if China is to move towards having a high-value market, it
will need a stable, dependable and cooperative workforce.201 Not ensuring
stability may result in a long-term lag in productivity, causing the country’s
industries to be less competitive globally.202
B.

Open-Term Contracts Can Aid China’s Industrial Shift While
Protecting Workers

The LCL will create better worker protections, which, in turn, should
facilitate China’s move towards value-added industries and increased
economic growth.
1.

The LCL Restricts Fixed-Term Contracts and Encourages Open-Term
Contracts, Which Will Improve Workers’ Conditions and Create a
Workforce Suitable for Value-Added Industries

The LCL’s limits on fixed-term contracts in favor of open-term
contracts will help China in its goal of improving employment relations.
This improvement could, in turn, increase harmony and profits at the same
194
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time. Other countries’ experiences have shown that open-term contracts
may provide more benefits than fixed-term contracts.203 Open-term
contracts can help foster China’s goals of social consensus and equality.204
Regulations expanding the use of open-term contracts can help offset the
inequalities of income created by the market and increase competitive
advantages.205 On the other hand, emphasis on fixed-term contracts can
increase the poverty risk for workers, which may result in social
dissension.206
Open-term contracts often reduce turnover while encouraging worker
loyalty, which helps employer profits and long-term growth.207 Open-term
contracts not only improve employee welfare but also efficiency, especially
in industries choosing to compete on quality rather than on mere price.208
Open-term contracts stimulate commitment and cooperation in the
employment relationship. Studies show that, as a result, both parties invest
more in training, which increases productivity.209
Along similar lines, LCL’s encouragement of open-term contracts
requires interaction among employers and workers, which can prove
beneficial for the employer’s business. Although Article 14 will increase
transaction costs for employers by requiring them to ensure that their
manuals and contracts are in compliance, it will also generate clearer
expectations for both parties by forcing employers to articulate the details of
the work relationship.210 According to one firm’s study conducted before the
enactment of LCL, Chinese workers cited dissatisfaction with their
compensation and benefits and noted that they did not know how their
performance was being measured.211 However, open-term contracts may
affect certain groups negatively.212 Better protection of workers and fixed
203
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labor costs from open-term contracts has been shown to increase
unemployment, particularly among the low-skilled work force.213 This could
be problematic in China, given that there is a huge population of low-skill
workers. One should keep in mind that fixed-term contracts are still
permitted under LCL and that options still exist to blunt potential negative
effects of open-term contracts. Fixed-term contracts will continue to be used
by employers where their use gives workers better incentive to be
productive.214
The limitations LCL places on the use of fixed-term contracts are
appropriate given the negative impacts that pervasive use of short fixed-term
contracts have on the workforce. There is no evidence that providing fixedterm contracts boosts long-term economic growth or creates higher levels of
employment.215 Studies show that low employment security results in
workers’ lack of identification with and loyalty to the corporation. That lack
of worker investment leads to under-investment in human resource
development, with workers not being encouraged to pursue further
training.216 For example, studies show that fixed-term contracts, as
compared to open-term contracts, in the United States and Spain have led to
decreased job stability, lower pay, worse working conditions, frequent
periods of unemployment, and higher poverty risk.217 In Spain, fixed-term
contracts have not created incentives for employers to rehire workers.218
South Korea, as mentioned earlier, is a prime example of some negative
effects of short fixed-term contracts.219 Hence, having only fixed-term
contracts can hinder national competitiveness and may actually exacerbate
unemployment in certain circumstances.220
China’s LCL balances the interests of employers and workers by
making open-term contracts the default mode for long-term employment, but
also allowing limited use of fixed-term contracts. While LCL clearly affords
some preference to open-term contracts, permitting fixed-term contracts will
help preserve employment opportunities for the low-skill workforce.
Additionally, LCL’s preference for open-term contracts will help transition
China’s economy to more value-added industries.
213
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VII. CONCLUSION
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy has
resulted in growing inequality and worker exploitation. China enacted the
Labor Law in 1994, but its requirement that employers use employment
contracts was weakly enforced, due in part to unclear expectations among
both employers and workers. The deficiencies of the Labor Law left many
workers unprotected and insecure, which began to threaten the stability of
China’s workforce.
The enactment of LCL in 2008 came at a crucial time. It addressed
many of the gaps left by the Labor Law. With LCL’s expanded and explicit
support of open-term contracts, both workers and employers better
understand the law governing employment relationships. The LCL prompts
employers to be more explicit in their requirements, creating clearer
expectations for both employers and workers, which should in turn lead to
better relations. The LCL also increases protection for workers without
preventing employers from terminating employees for just cause. While
Article 14 does not completely resolve the issue of whether an employer is
obligated to renew a second fixed-term contract,221 foreign companies
should not feel threatened by the possibilities of having open-term contracts.
Open-term contracts will not constitute employment for life, nor will their
protections under LCL prove as inflexible as similar provisions in South
Korean labor law.
Open-term contracts may also aid China in its transition into a more
high-value, industrialized economy. While LCL does not target foreign
companies, it remains unclear whether the law will be enforced
appropriately—particularly because the regulations were passed very
recently. Foreign corporations will likely need more time to evaluate the
law’s impact on their daily business. Yet, they can be assured that LCL does
not amount to a reversion to the “iron rice bowl” system. It is now up to the
Chinese government and local tribunals to realize LCL’s promise.

221

See supra Part IV.C.2.

